> For AI agents: the complete documentation index is available at https://jig.md/llms.txt, the full documentation bundle is available at https://jig.md/llms-full.txt. # Finite ACP resource **Status:** experimental alpha candidate. Native restoration requires matching source artifacts and separate installed-client qualification; this specification does not establish registry availability or successful live restoration. This invocation connects an ordinary Agent Flow to one host-authorized native ACP conversation. The Flow owns the procedure and interprets its answer. The host owns the native process, private authentication, reviewed configuration, allowed dispatch, deadlines and cleanup. This is a finite protocol resource, not unrestricted process I/O or a general Agent service. The [invocation descriptor](https://jig.md/contracts/finite-acp/contract.json) and its [requests](https://jig.md/contracts/finite-acp/requests.json) and [responses](https://jig.md/contracts/finite-acp/responses.json) channel agreements form one exact offline bundle. Identity matching is offline; the identifier URLs neither fetch implementations nor grant authority. Client availability remains a host-profile qualification, not a descriptor promise. ## One invocation, two direct channels An ordinary Agent package requires this interface through a named slot. Its Binding selects the native client through an ordinary resource grant: ```ts defineBinding({ package: 'flows/agent', slots: { native: { kind: 'acp', client: 'codex' } }, }) ``` The host qualifies that exact client using operator configuration captured before project loading. Review identifies the recipient, client, model, authentication mode and executable. The explicit review-only `--agent` operand may construct an effective client for every selected ACP policy under [project policy](https://jig.md/spec/project-policy.md#review-client-selection), with source and argument origin visible. No ambient global Agent selection, guessed slot name or Flow-authored environment creates this authority. Changed runtime identity requires renewed review; the launch still revalidates its artifacts. An optional grant `model` selects the model for this recipient, overriding the matching operator model variable without changing authentication mode, endpoint, provider or executable. It is 1–256 ASCII characters: an initial letter or digit, then letters, digits or `._:/+-`. Omission retains the selected client's operator configuration and documented default. Two Bindings can use the same client with different models. Changing this policy requires renewed authority approval; the ready configuration and native dispatch enforce the selected model. Input is normally `null`. A requested native session uses the closed shape `{session:{retain:true}}`, `{session:{retain:true,lifetime:"run"}}`, or `{session:{restore:reference}}`, where `reference` is an opaque, canonical lowercase 36-character UUID from a previous final resource result. Either request requires the separately reviewed grant `retainSessions:true`; omission of that grant permits only ephemeral calls. `restore` also requests a successor snapshot after the new invocation settles. See [retained native state](#retained-native-state). Both channels are required and direct: the resource receives `requests` and sends `responses`. The adapter creates the channels through the ordinary SDK and transfers the opposite endpoints in one exact slot call: ```ts const requests = await run.channel({ contract: './contracts/finite-acp/requests.json' }) const responses = await run.channel({ contract: './contracts/finite-acp/responses.json' }) const resource = run.call({ operationId: 'native', slot: 'native', input: null, channels: { requests: requests.receive, responses: responses.send }, }) ``` The caller must consume responses while sending requests and await `resource`. Neither channel EOF nor a completed ACP prompt proves resource settlement. The first response is exactly one non-secret ready record: ```json { "kind": "ready", "protocolVersion": 1, "cwd": "/work", "maxTurns": 1, "configuration": [{ "configId": "model", "value": "reviewed-model" }], "modeId": "read-only" } ``` `maxTurns` is the reviewed grant's prompt allowance (1–8; omitted grant policy means 1). It is included in ready for the method to explain limits; only host policy grants dispatch. Changing the allowance requires renewed approval. `configuration` is an ordered array, possibly empty. String settings use `{configId,value}`; Boolean settings use `{configId,type:"boolean",value}`. Configuration IDs are unique; at most 16 are supplied. Identifiers and string values are nonempty Unicode scalar text, contain no NUL, and are at most 1,024 UTF-8 bytes. `modeId` is optional. For an authorized restoration, ready also contains `restoreSessionId`, the host-owned native ACP session identifier from the claimed snapshot. It is private transport metadata, distinct from the public opaque reference; the Agent method must not copy it into public output. It is absent for a new session. The complete ready item must fit 64 KiB. Fields are closed: no credential, executable path, authentication request, provider endpoint or unrestricted client metadata belongs here. Ready means the reviewed transport is armed, not that ACP initialization, authentication or the Agent task succeeded. It reflects the same immutable configuration the host independently enforces. Editing the received value or copying another ready record cannot change dispatch authority. ## Bounded text framing Subsequent responses and all requests use the same fragment shape: ```json { "kind": "data", "text": "part of one JSON frame", "end": false } ``` Concatenate `text` in received order until `end:true`. That closes one complete ACP JSON/0 frame. There is only one partial frame per direction; frames cannot interleave. Text chunks are nonempty, at most 8,192 UTF-8 bytes, and cut only between Unicode scalars. This leaves room for JSON escaping within the common 64 KiB channel item bound. Transport is not binary and has no fragment replay, independent chunk identity, or reconnect mechanism. | Bound | Requests | Responses | | ----------------------------------- | -------- | --------- | | One reassembled frame | 16 MiB | 16 MiB | | Cumulative reassembled bytes | 8 MiB | 32 MiB | | Complete frames | 64 | 8,192 | | Fragments, including partial frames | 16,384 | 16,384 | Count received bytes before allocating additional reassembly storage. Malformed framing, an exceeded limit or EOF inside a frame fails the stream permanently. Receiving a fragment does not establish dispatch. The host validates complete JSON/0, finite protocol state and reviewed authority before forwarding the frame; its operation allowance is consumed before any possibly uncertain write. These bounded text fragments use ordinary FLOW channels. Jig's common source lifetime limit is 64 MiB, including envelope bytes; its 64 KiB item, 256 KiB queue and 16 pending-send limits still apply. No native-only exemption permits an unbounded queue. The larger cumulative allowance preserves the existing bounded native text response when its necessary framing crosses a Flow boundary. ## Finite ACP authority profile The host accepts one serial sequence, with unique bounded request IDs: 1. ACP `initialize` at version 1, without client tool or authentication powers. 2. One `session/new` at `/work`, with an empty `mcpServers` array and no `_meta`, or, when ready contains `restoreSessionId`, exactly one `session/resume` with `{sessionId:restoreSessionId,cwd:"/work",mcpServers:[]}`. Restoration requires initialization to advertise `agentCapabilities.sessionCapabilities.resume`; no `session/new` fallback is permitted. 3. Each exact ready configuration transition, in order, with confirmation of its reviewed value; then the exact mode transition if present. 4. Up to the grant's `maxTurns` serial `session/prompt` requests on the owned session, each containing one text block, at most 1 MiB. The preceding prompt must settle before another dispatch. NUL and leading slash commands are excluded. 5. Optional `session/close` if the initialized client advertised it. For example, after `session/new` returns `sessionId:"owned-session"`, the ready record above requires these requests in order, each with a fresh request ID and each awaiting its correlated result: ```json {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":3,"method":"session/set_config_option","params":{"sessionId":"owned-session","configId":"model","value":"reviewed-model"}} {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":4,"method":"session/set_mode","params":{"sessionId":"owned-session","modeId":"read-only"}} ``` These are separate JSON/0 frames, each sent through the bounded fragments above. Use the actual owned session ID and ready values. A Boolean configuration entry also requires `type:"boolean"` in its request parameters. The configuration result must confirm the selected value in `configOptions`; the mode result is `{}`. Neither step is optional merely because the native client already reports the same setting. Only then may a prompt be sent. After each prompt is dispatched, at most one `session/cancel` notification may name that owned session. It cannot settle pending work by itself. A cancellation that races completed settlement is consumed without forwarding to the idle client. An active interruption must settle within five seconds; otherwise the host fences the resource and reports unsuccessful/uncertain execution. New session IDs come from the correlated `session/new` response, never from a notification. A restored session uses only the already-claimed identifier in ready; its correlated resume result is projected as exactly `{}`. Current reviewed configuration and mode must be reapplied before the first prompt. Excess prompts, overlapping prompts, extra sessions, provider selection, authentication, tools, filesystem requests, unreviewed mode changes, unclaimed session replacement and metadata are rejected. Native permission requests receive the host's fixed cancelled answer, not a choice made by the editable adapter. Native text and plan updates outside an active prompt fail rather than contaminating a subsequent answer. Aggregate frame, byte, update and text ceilings never reset between turns. Only correlated results, sanitized request errors, public assistant text, public plan updates and closed warning notices reach the adapter. Unneeded native fields are withheld. One conversation permits at most 4,096 updates, 8 MiB of assistant text and 256 permission requests; raw native protocol ingress remains bounded at 32 MiB before projection. The host accounts for ignored frames too. Request errors retain a safe integer native code and the fixed message `Native ACP request failed`; raw native text and data are withheld. For the host-selected Codex client only, a `session/new` error with code `-32603`, message `Internal error`, and string data beginning exactly `failed to load configuration: Failed to synchronize managed preferences\n\nCheck ` projects the additional closed data `{"reason":"managed-preferences-unavailable"}`. The private guidance suffix is discarded. Other clients, operations and error shapes receive no reason. This is a native client report, not a diagnosis of sandbox policy, authentication, remote effects, cleanup, or permission to repeat the call. The ordinary Agent independently recognizes only that exact one-field reason object in the matching operation/code context and uses fixed explanatory text; unknown causes remain explicitly unavailable. The recognized explanation asks the installation's operator to check managed-preference configuration and availability, without prescribing a repair or authorizing another call. The host negotiates the supported typed native diagnostic extension independently of Flow input. Warnings are projected as `session/update` with `update:{sessionUpdate:"session_info_update",_meta:{notice:{code:"NATIVE_WARNING"}}}`. They carry no raw native title, action, path or credential. Notices preceding the owned session response are coalesced and delivered after that response; they never establish session identity. Warnings may also arrive between turns or after the final answer. The ordinary Agent reports a fixed console diagnostic, not answer text or a public Agent event. An authoritative native error on either a notification or result fails the resource, including during startup and after prompt settlement; negotiating typed diagnostics must not hide native failure. Protocol accounting is not containment. An approved native executable still receives the required private authentication and may require network access. The host must qualify and retain its launch profile independently; this contract does not make arbitrary credential-bearing code safe. Secret bootstrap stays outside the adapter channel. A client requiring secret-bearing ACP authentication needs separately implemented host mediation before it qualifies. ## Settlement and failure Clean request EOF is eligible only after the finite protocol has settled: no request is pending, and either a prompt has returned its correlated terminal result or a correlated native request error has ended the conversation. A successful `initialize` and `session/new`, even followed by all configuration and mode transitions, do not establish settlement. This interface has no successful zero-prompt startup-only invocation; closing there is a protocol failure. Optional `session/close` has the same settlement prerequisite and must receive its correlated result before EOF. The host ends native input and waits for owned process cleanup, using bounded controlled termination if needed. Successful resource output contains actual process evidence: ```json { "outcome": "done", "output": { "stopReason": "closed", "exitCode": null, "signal": "SIGTERM", "cleanup": "complete" } } ``` `stopReason:"exited"` denotes an observed process exit; the Agent adapter requires exit zero without a signal. `"closed"` denotes closure requested by the clean, settled request stream, followed by controlled process cleanup. Its nullable exit code and signal report what happened, not invented success. Root cancellation, deadline, uncertain ownership, failed cleanup, unauthorized dispatch and broken essential transport remain invocation errors; they cannot be relabelled `closed`. After possible dispatch, a recognized native session failure or finite-protocol rejection retains a closed explanation alongside `UNCERTAIN`. The host never copies an exception message or native diagnostic into that explanation. Unclassified failures remain unspecified; a warning alone establishes no cause. Cancellation, deadline and cleanup failure keep their existing precedence. An explanation neither proves whether remote work occurred nor permits retry. Response framing must finish and its writer must close before the resource returns. Essential channel failure cancels/fences the resource and waits for owned work to settle. No uncertain operation is retried. Process settlement, ACP stop reason and the application-checked Agent answer remain distinct. The host does not reconstruct an Agent answer in this resource result. If input requested a session, the successful final resource `output` also contains exactly one receipt: `session:{status:"retained",reference:uuid}` or `session:{status:"unavailable",reason}`. Otherwise it omits `session`. Receipt meaning is independent of the Agent's answer and requires the additional evidence below. ## Retained native state Retention crosses a lifetime and authority boundary, so the host owns its collection, protected storage and restoration. The ordinary Agent Flow passes the explicit request and final receipt without reading native files or supplying storage paths. `retainSessions:true` is separate reviewed authority from model, credentials and `maxTurns`; possession of a reference cannot replace it. The initial collection profile accepts Codex 0.154.0 with exactly one owned rollout JSONL file. Its records must identify the owned session, be complete, contain the required final turn completion, fit the bound and exclude credential content. Unrecognized versions, extra or unowned rollout files, invalid paths, incomplete records and oversized or credential-bearing state are unavailable. The profile copies no home directory, SQLite database, authentication, tools, forks, partial turns or compaction state. These restrictions do not grant the native client additional tools or workspace access. The host returns `retained` only after the final native turn has settled, an actual clean native exit has been observed, the complete owned scope has been fenced, bounded collection has passed profile validation, execution resources have been cleaned up and the protected snapshot has committed atomically. Controlled or forced closure cannot yield a reference, even if a termination handler exits zero. A clean protocol close that needs controlled termination may still produce the ordinary successful resource result with `session:{status:"unavailable",reason:"not-cleanly-closed"}`. Retention failure does not invalidate a separately valid Agent answer, but it never hides a resource execution or cleanup failure that already requires an invocation error. Before consuming a reference, the host checks current authorization against the protected project identity, root target and request digest, ordered target/request-digest ancestry, immediate native slot and exact provider/profile digest. Operation identifiers and ordinary prompt input do not bind restoration. Run-scoped state additionally requires the original root Run identity and its active authority; ordinary retained state may cross Runs. Aliases selecting the same admitted target are equivalent; this profile does not promise isolation by incoming slot alias. Accepted code or configuration changes that alter these identities require a new conversation. A reference is claimed atomically once before native startup, with restored bytes placed in a fresh private scope. Concurrent claims cannot create two owners. A claim is consumed even if subsequent startup, resume or execution fails. Unsupported, expired, foreign and reused references fail visibly. The host does not silently create a session, replay a transcript, retry uncertain work or restore authentication. Current grants and current credentials are revalidated independently of retained content. The protected project store permits at most 16 available snapshots, each at most 8 MiB. Available snapshots expire logically after 24 hours and are pruned on the next store access; this is not an automatic secure-erasure promise. `lifetime:"run"` additionally binds retained state to the current root. Its successor inherits that restriction with no option to widen it. The reference survives individual Agent calls but cannot be claimed from another root, even with an otherwise matching recipient. Root settlement deletes its temporary snapshots in the same transaction that publishes its terminal; deletion failure prevents that terminal commit. Recovery uses the same cleanup path. Interrupted or uncertain cleanup must not be described as successful erasure. Persistent cross-Run snapshots are untouched by this cleanup. Consumed payloads are replaced rather than accumulating tombstones, references are never recycled, and active ownership remains accountable after expiry. A successor reference is exposed only after the full settlement and commit sequence above. Exhausted storage or failed validation yields unavailable retention rather than an invented reference. Corrupt protected state, storage commit uncertainty or lost coordinator authority fails the operation; it is not downgraded to optional retention loss. Unexpected collector or I/O errors also remain invocation failures, rather than being labelled unsupported history. Unavailable receipts require one closed reason: | Reason | Meaning | | --------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `not-cleanly-closed` | Native exit did not qualify for retention, including controlled termination. | | `missing-history` | Clean native exit produced no rollout in its owned output. | | `unsupported-history` | Collected history failed the bounded qualified-content profile. | | `capacity` | The protected store already holds sixteen available snapshots. | These reasons describe this invocation's retention only. Refusal to restore a reference does not reveal whether it belongs to another recipient, expired or was consumed. Neither kind of failure authorizes automatic replay. Protocol and storage tests establish only their tested boundaries. Actual save, clean exit and restoration across fresh Runs through the installed Agent/ACP/Jig path require separate native-client qualification. ## Optional presentation is separate The Agent Flow may project selected updates into its optional `events` channel. That channel is not either essential transport channel. Display failure must not manufacture Agent success or lose the execution result. The ordinary adapter uses a bounded relay. After a rejected write, oversized item, full local queue or 500 ms blocked send, it discards the entire remaining suffix, reports a fixed incomplete-progress diagnostic and declares an abnormal writer end through `close({error:"LAGGED"})`. Active receivers receive the sticky stream failure using ordinary language recovery. It never resumes after an unmarked gap. A committed read remains valid; queued uncommitted items can be discarded. The producer declaration is incomplete-observation evidence, not an Agent or process result. No private host access is needed. ## Native client profiles The finite resource supports the following reviewed native client profiles. Each client contributes only the configuration needed to launch its own ACP adapter: | Client | Host selection | Subscription configuration | API configuration | | ----------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Codex | `{ kind: 'acp', client: 'codex' }`; optional absolute `CODEX_PATH` | Operator-owned, file-backed `$CODEX_HOME/auth.json` (default `~/.codex/auth.json`), created by `codex login`; optional `CODEX_MODEL`, with omission retaining the client default | `OPENAI_API_KEY` and a grant `model` or `OPENAI_MODEL`; optional `OPENAI_BASE_URL`; `OPENAI_API` must be omitted or `responses` | | Claude Code | `{ kind: 'acp', client: 'claude' }`; optional absolute `CLAUDE_PATH` | `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`; optional `CLAUDE_MODEL` | Exactly one of `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` or `ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN`, plus a grant `model` or `ANTHROPIC_MODEL`; optional `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` | | Pi | `{ kind: 'acp', client: 'pi' }`; optional absolute `PI_PATH` | `PI_PROVIDER` and a grant `model` or `PI_MODEL`; authentication from `PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR/auth.json` or `~/.pi/agent/auth.json` | `PI_PROVIDER`, a grant `model` or `PI_MODEL`, and `PI_API_KEY`, using a provider implemented by Pi | The current Pi profile accepts the official self-contained Linux x64 Pi 0.84.4 release layout. It does not interpret the multi-file npm installation or make Node part of Jig's runtime closure. Jig snapshots the operator environment before loading project code. An explicit `CODEX_PATH`, `CLAUDE_PATH`, or `PI_PATH` selects that client's executable and must be an absolute path; an invalid override fails without fallback. Otherwise, Jig searches the operator's `PATH` in order for `codex`, `claude`, or `pi`. Empty and relative entries are ignored. Implicit discovery excludes the project tree and ancestor `node_modules` directories, including symlink routes through those locations. Operator-managed symlinks are supported. Shell aliases are not executables. For Codex, the current official npm `bin/codex.js` layout resolves statically to its declared `@openai/codex--` native dependency. The launcher manifest must name `@openai/codex`, declare that bin, and pin the matching platform alias; the native package must match its version, OS and CPU. The nearest installed platform package wins; an invalid package cannot fall back to another copy. Lookup is bounded to 32 ancestors of the selected launcher. Codex also recognizes a Volta dispatcher in its `bin` directory. It reads the operator's absolute `VOLTA_HOME`, when set, or the dispatcher's installation root. The bounded `tools/user/bins/codex.json` record must select the matching `@openai/codex` version with the Npm manager, and its recorded image's bin must resolve to the supported npm layout. This selects Volta's global installation; project-local tool dependencies remain excluded. Invalid explicit `VOLTA_HOME` does not fall back to the dispatcher root. These installation records are regular UTF-8 JSON files of at most 64 KiB each, and all inferred metadata and native paths must remain outside project routes, including with an explicit launcher override. Jig never executes these dispatchers or npm launchers, interprets their program contents or extra flags/environment, or retains their Node runtime. It resolves the native file before ordinary runtime inspection and review. Unsupported layouts retain the wrapper refusal; a direct native executable remains an explicit selection option. This does not add npm or Volta support for Claude/Pi. The selected regular executable and client-specific support files receive the same validation and identity checks with either selection method. Invalid client support fails without trying another installation. Review shows the native client and its resolved operator executable path. Launch uses the resolved executable checked against admitted provider identity, without repeating host PATH discovery. A changed selection cannot silently replace reviewed executable or support bytes. On Linux, all three native adapters inspect x86-64 ELF executables. Codex and Claude Code also accept the declarative `makeBinaryWrapper` form which preserves arguments and prefixes PATH; Pi requires its unwrapped standalone executable. Arbitrary shell/JavaScript wrappers, wrapper flags or environment changes, and nested wrappers are unsupported. The static Codex npm selection above does not execute a wrapper. Jig reads installation metadata without executing the client during review. It retains the wrapped executable, ELF interpreter, and transitive shared libraries as individual regular files at their installation paths. Library resolution uses ELF RUNPATH/RPATH, `$ORIGIN`, the selected interpreter’s directory (including its canonical location), and supported Linux loader locations; it does not import ambient loader variables or whole runtime directories. Missing, malformed, project-selected, or unsupported dependencies fail closed. Each executable's runtime dependency walk is bounded to 128 file destinations. Pi's matching manifest and themes remain beside its native executable and cannot be selected through the project tree. Bun's private loader settings are removed before each native client starts, so its libraries use the reviewed installation's ABI. On qualified Macs, the adapters inspect native-architecture Mach-O executable and library metadata without running the selected client during review. Jig retains exact regular-file dependencies outside project source and rechecks their digests before launch; qualified system-cache libraries remain OS support. A different architecture, unsupported load command, missing library, or project-selected dependency fails closed. On Linux, for Codex's nested sandbox, Jig selects the first eligible unprivileged `bwrap` from the wrapper's declared PATH prefix followed by operator PATH, with the same project and dependency-directory exclusions as client discovery. With no eligible helper, it selects the installation's matching `codex-resources/bwrap` beside the executable directory or its parent. A PATH-selected helper is never substituted at the vendor bundle path. `JIG_BWRAP_PATH` selects only Jig's outer containment tool. Executable, wrapper, helper, shared-library bytes, and their contained paths enter provider identity and are revalidated before launch. A bundled fallback stays off PATH so Codex applies its vendor integrity check. For a PATH-selected helper, only its directory enters the initial contained PATH; other operator PATH entries do not become filesystem authority. Subscription mode requires Codex's `cli_auth_credentials_store = "file"` setting. Jig reads the current operator's file during review and Run, validates it, discards its refresh token, and gives the contained client only a short-lived non-refreshable bearer. It never embeds a development credential or mounts the operator's `CODEX_HOME`. A keyring-backed login is unavailable because the Agent process receives no host credential-store authority. Native Codex's API-key path is Responses-compatible only; selecting `chat-completions` fails closed. Claude Code uses its Anthropic-compatible API path. `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` selects API-key authentication; `ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN` selects bearer-token authentication, with the API-key channel explicitly blanked inside the client process. Supplying both nonempty credentials is ambiguous and fails closed. Pi delegates an API-key selection to the exact built-in provider named by `PI_PROVIDER`; Jig does not add an endpoint or provider registry. Pi subscription support is currently bounded to its `anthropic` and `openai-codex` providers. No native profile hard-codes a production model. Jig reads native credentials in trusted host code and gives the contained client only the bounded credential projection needed for one provider lifetime. Credential sources are not mounted. The selected non-secret client, API, endpoint, model, and exact executable/support identities enter provider identity and the reviewed Plan; secrets do not. Changing non-secret behavior requires another `jig review` and approval, while rotating only the selected credential does not. The Flow remains in its ordinary network-isolated, keyless sandbox. Native ACP clients run in separate bounded scopes with inherited network access. Each native client starts in an empty work directory. The finite ACP peer advertises no filesystem, terminal, or MCP client capability, supplies no MCP servers, and denies permission requests. Claude and Pi additionally disable native tools and ambient extensions/skills through their fixed profiles. Codex retains its constrained native tool environment: its pinned read-only ACP mode selects a no-network workspace policy and Jig refuses permission requests. Linux additionally supplies managed requirements forbidding full-access mode; rootless Mac execution does not mount that file at `/etc/codex`. Subscription authentication uses a one-use in-memory login and ephemeral credential storage, so no subscription credential file is exposed to native tools. The editable Flow cannot change those profiles or request additional authority. Selected FLOW skills are rendered into the call instructions as bounded read-only text; they are not exposed as a client filesystem or native skill installation. On Intel macOS 14.4.1 (Darwin 23.4.0 build 23E224), the verified Codex profile also receives exact preference-service lookup and read-only access to the daemon/current-UID invalidation-counter pages required for configuration synchronization. It receives no permission to read or write host preference values. The pages contain counters, including change activity across domains; they do not contain preference dictionaries. Other scopes receive none of this access, and offline execution gains no network authority. A fresh trusted observation synchronizes `com.openai.codex` before selection and each native launch, including restoration. It checks the native `config_toml_base64` and `requirements_toml_base64` forced inputs plus forced keys in the public suite search list. Configured managed policy or unavailable observation refuses the contained profile with a value-free diagnostic. Ordinary nonforced preferences may exist and remain unreadable. This qualifies the observed absence of managed policy, not continuous enforcement of policy introduced after the check. Managed-policy consumption, other macOS profiles, and changed native preference interfaces require separate qualification. Rosetta and Apple Silicon are refused for this Codex path. The observer also refuses an inherited sandbox and has its own deadline even if the host exits. Native workers have ordinary inherited network access rather than endpoint-filtered egress; their exact trusted bytes and configuration, not a network-policy framework, limit what they do. The ordinary API method instead uses the exact [HTTP Request](https://jig.md/spec/http-request.md) resource. Its API requests ask for `store: false`; this is not a promise about an endpoint's retention or training policy. The native Codex Responses base URL must use HTTPS without URL credentials, a query or a fragment. Endpoint selection does not disable TLS certificate verification. If the selected client, executable support, credential, or model is missing or invalid, SDK qualification records that native-grant target as unavailable. CLI review refuses the complete project before new approval or otherwise unchanged success on any observed typed selected ACP prerequisite, even when unrelated targets are ready. A known setup failure uses `PROJECT_ACP__`, with client `CODEX`, `CLAUDE` or `PI`. Stages distinguish `EXECUTABLE` discovery, `INSTALLATION` support, Codex `SANDBOX` support, `LOGIN` subscription authentication, `API` configuration and missing `MODEL` selection. Mac Codex also distinguishes unavailable `PREFERENCES` observation from unsupported `MANAGED_POLICY`. The CLI gives client-specific corrections without publishing raw exceptions or secret values. Unclassified failures remain `PROJECT_ACP_UNAVAILABLE`; the host does not guess their cause. A failed review preserves the earlier approved code and client together. A target without native requirements in that already admitted generation remains subject to normal Run admission/environment checks; its recipe does not depend on the Agent implementation. `jig review` authenticates and admits the selected local configuration. It does not send a remote health-check request, so `ready` does not assert that a model endpoint is currently reachable or accepting requests. Root `jig run --timeout DURATION` bounds the complete sequence, including the Agent call and any selected child. The default is 30 seconds and the maximum is 24 hours; neither an API worker, native client, nor child can extend the root's absolute deadline. Cancellation fences Jig's complete local Agent scope, though it cannot retract a remote request already accepted.